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together and keeps it rolling. But I also want to step in and help when it 
rolls over a group of mothers or ranchers without looking and without 
stopping. Ceccarelli is undoubtedly right that we need to come up with a 
system and a forum for marshaling our spadework into bulwarks from 
which we can see other publics, they can see us, and we can start to 
cooperate on projects. But visibility creates its own problems, as we can 
witness in the enormous political pressure placed on many of our 
colleagues in science communication. Let’s say we did manage to put 
together that explanatory cognitive theory of rhetoric of science. Let’s say 
we operationalized it so that we could predict the positions of stakeholder 
groups and the outcomes of public science policy debates with 95% 
accuracy. Without a doubt we’d hold seats on every government advisory 
committee from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
(ATF) to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). But is that 
really what we want, to be integral to the national science-policy 
machine? In our quest to be useful to our polities, is it our ultimate goal to 
help scientists persuade the public?  
This, then, is the synthetic problem posed by Harris’s and Ceccarelli’s 
papers: how do we achieve greater disciplinary rigor without losing our 
civic edge, and how do we make ourselves a public resource without 
becoming a tool of hegemony? It puts me in mind again of Socrates, who 
refused to serve in the government or retreat to a patron’s estate to write 
books, who instead wandered around the polis scrounging free dinners 
and prodding his hosts’ full bellies with the sharp stick of the dialectic. 
Like Socrates, I do not have a synthesis to offer to the dialect of 
disciplinarity and engagement in rhetoric of science, but I do have a 
myth: 
A few years ago, NASA convened an invitation-only conference to 
discuss geo-engineering proposals to mitigate global warming. One 
proposal was to deploy giant space mirrors between the sun and the earth 
to reflect back some of the sun’s rays; another was to spray tons of 
particulate matter into the ionosphere to simulate a volcanic eruption and 
scatter sunlight; a third was to spray hundreds of thousands of gallons of 
sea water into the sky to make a sort of cloud umbrella for the earth. 
NASA representatives nodded and ruminated: some of these proposals 
were intriguing and not too expensive. Then, Jim Fleming stood up to 
present.  Jim, an atmospheric physicist turned historian of science, 
presented archival evidence on mid-century weather control efforts that 
revealed that most of the solutions being proposed at the conference had 
already been tried—and had failed miserably at massive public expense 
and environmental cost (Fleming, 2006). Jim’s impression was that his 
testimony convinced NASA to table some of the more radical proposals. 
I found this story compelling when Jim told it to me in a bar in 
Potsdam, and I believe it contains a fragment of a workable synthesis to 
the dialectic of engagement and disciplinarity. But as with all myths, I 
can’t clearly state its moral for rhetoricians of science in the twenty-first 
century. Meanwhile, Herndl & Cutlip’s paper (this issue) issues a sobering 
reminder that cuts through the myth’s rosy haze: rhetoricians of science 
only have so much agency to choose their political positions. There are so 
many constraints. No matter where we try to position ourselves—as 
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cognitive scientists, advocates, consultants, or deans—those performances 
have to be recognized to stick, and institutionally speaking, rhetoric has 
been slippery. Nevertheless, in both Herndl & Cutlip’s story about the new 
sustainability college and in Jim’s story about his NASA consultation, I 
sense a hopeful resonance: institutions are turning to rhetoricians to help 
them “bring things together in matters of concern” (Herndl & Cutlip, this 
issue). The very features that were our Achilles heel in the old Germanic 
university—our insistence on kairos over categories, on people over ideas, 
our insouciant interdisciplinarity, our myriad methods both humanistic 
and non-humanistic—these now appear to be positioning rhetoric as a 
touchstone as the old university structure slowly (slowly) breaks up and 
as problems, not disciplines, promise to drive its reformation. In other 
words, to increase our traction on debates about science, rhetoricians may 
not have to move at all—toward disciplinarity, toward engagement, or in 
any other direction. Because unless my eye deceives me, the horizon is 
moving toward us. 
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